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B.: Eminent Domain--Obsolete Buildings--Proof of Value
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
ardson v. City Trust Co., 27 F. (2d) 35 (C. C. A. 7th, 1928); while
the right to dower is inchoate and does not ripen into an estate or interest until death of the spouse. To allow dower as against a right
vested in a third person at the time of marriage would therefore be
to make an inchoate right superior to a vested absolute right, prior
in time. The instant ease does not involve, nor purport to settle,
the effect of an antecedent contract on realty acquired by the promisor after his marriage.

EMINENT DOMAIN-OBSOLETE BUILDINGS--PROOF OF VALUE.-

The state road commission skillfully and properly performed work of
improvement upon land taken by eminent domain for a public road.
Resulting slides, however, completely destroyed a vacated hospital
building on the unappropriated portion of the land. At the trial in
the eminent domain proceeding, the owners introduced evidence
over objection showing the reproduction cost of the building at
present price levels, less depreciation, but no evidence to show that
immediately prior to its destruction the building had any market
value or could serve any useful purpose. The court instructed on
the reproduction cost theory of recovery and refused the state's requested instructions on the "willing buyer-willing seller" theory
of market value specifically calling attention to the long continued
edsuse of the building. Verdict and judgment for the owner includ-,d compensation for the building despite the lack of showing of any
current market for it. Held, reversible error to permit introduction
of evidence as to the reproduction cost, less depreciation, of a building in eminent domain proceedings without a showing of actual
value. Judgment reversed and remanded for new trial. State, by
State Road Commission v. Boyd, 41 S. E. (2d) 665 (W. Va. 1947).
Following the eclectic principle of allowing the jury in eminent.
domain proceedings to consider a wide range of evidence connected
with value and in sustaining verdicts based on such a composite
showing, West Virginia has specifically approved consideration of
reproduction cost less depreciation as bearing on valuation of
property in eminent domain proceedings. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v.
Bonafield, 79 W. Va. 287, 90 S. E. 868 (1916) ; cf. Hea rn v. MaDonald, 69 W. Va. 435, 71 S. E. 568 (1911). The general practice is
of course to regard fair market value as the test determining proper
valuation for compensation purposes, Tennessee Valley Authority

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1948

1

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 1 [1948], Art. 8
CASE COMMENTS
v. Powelson, 118 F. (2d) 79 (C. C. A. 41h, 1941); Chicago v. Farwell, 286 Ill. 415, 121 N. E. 795 (1918) ; Sparkill Really Corp. v.
State, 268 N. Y. 192, 197 N. E. 192 (1935); Charlcs v. Big Sandy &
C. Ry., 142 Va. 512, 129 S. E. 384 (1925), and the rule in this
state does not purport to adopt a different test but to accept evidence of reproduction cost as bearing on it. Baltsvtore & 0. R. R. v.
Bonafield, supra at 295, 296. On the general principle, that "whoii
there is no market value, the value must be got at by the best proof
to be had," 1 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES 491 (9th ed. 1913), proof of reproduction cost has been allowed to establish measure of damages
in tort actions for conversion, Allis-Chalm6rs Mfg. Co. v. Board, 118
S. W. (2d) 996 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938) and negligent injury to
eiattels, International-GreatNorthern Ry. v. Casty, 46 S. W. (2d)
669 (Tex. Comm. App. 1932). To determine the value of a large produce market, a unique property returning substantial revenues, it
has been held, on appraising it under a special eminent domain statute thought to preclude consideration of certain other evidence, that
the only "just and legal" method of arriving at the fair value of the
property to be taken was the cost of reproduction based upon present
values, less depreciation. In re United States Commission to Appraise Washington Market Co. Property, 295 F. 950 (App. D. C.
1927). In all these situations, however, the property evaluated was
concededly of some value, the only problem being to choose a method
of measuring that value. If no market value of the property is
shown and no rental value, it has been held, in suits for negligent
destruction of abandoned structures of special design, a judgment
measured only by reproduction cost without regard to location or
available uses could not be sustained, Olds v. Von Der Ilellen, 127
Ore. 276. 263 Pac. 907 (1928) (depot), and that admitting evidence
bearing on reproduction cost was reversible error. Chwago & N. IV.
Ry. v. Davis, 78 Ill. App. 58 (1898) (tumble-down icehouse). In extending to eminent domain proceedings the principles applied in
these tort cases and not following the lead given by Matter of the
City of New York, 265 N. Y. 170, 192 N. E. 188 (1934), allowing recovery in eminent domain proceedings for the cost of unsalable
casements of light and air. the court has acted wisely. Indeed,
should occasion arise, it might be well to go further and re-examine
our doctrine allowing proof of reproduction cost in eminent domain
proceedings as evidence of value of structures having some value,
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trial it should be remembered that a demand for a possible special
use need not necessarily be shown before the jury can consider it as
indicative of worth. Illinois Light & Powcr Co. v. Bedard, 343 111.
618, 175 N. E. 851 (1931). And property should not be deemed
worthless, as respects compensation of the owner in eminent domain
proceedings, merely because he allows it to go to waste or is unable
to put it to any use, Mississippi & Rum River Boom Co. v. Patterson,
98 U. S. 403 (1878).
J.W. B.
EVihENCE-EARSAY-SPNTANEOUS ExcLAAUION.-Plaintiff
was injured when struck by a truck driven by an employee of defendant. In an action to recover damages for personal injury, witnesses
were permitted "on the theory that it was part of the res gestae" to
testify over objection that they heard a fellow employee of the driver
who was in the truck with him say. imediately following the accident, that he told the driver just before the accident that he was
driving too fast. After verdict and judgment for plaintiff., admission of such statement in evidence was assigned as error. Held, not
crror to admit the statement. Judgment affirmed. Jones v. Ambrose, 38 S. E. (2d) 263 (W. Va. 1946).
The subject of res gestae isin theory simple. Every circumstance or declaration which grows out of the main transaction, is
contemporaneous with it, and serves to illustrate its character, is
admissible. Cf. State v. Prater,52 W. Va. 122, 43 S. E. 230 (1902) ;
Sample v. Consolidated etc. Co., 50 W. Va. 472, 40 S. E. 597 (.1901).
Relevant circumstances not consisting of statements may usually be
proven, but when accompanying utterances are offered to prove the
truth of the facts asserted, a more difficult problem is presented.
By the orthodox view, hearsay statements are admissible as part of
the res gestae if (1) there is some nonverbal act that is itself admissible under the issue, (2) the statements characterize or explain the
act and (3)the statements and the act accompany each other, i. e.
are contemporaneous. Sample v. Consolidated, etc., Co., 50 W. Va.
472, 40 S. E. 597 (1901) ; Hardman, ,Spontaneous Exclamation v.
Res Gestae (1918) 25 W. VA. L. Q. 341. Declarations merely narrative of a past occurrence, though made ever so soon after the event,
cannot be received as proof of the event since they are not contemporaneous with the main transaction. Hawker v. Balitmore & Ohio
R. R., 15 W. Va. 628 (1879); Corder v. Talbot, 14 W. Va. 277

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1948

3

